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OFFERS OF PROOF IN NEBRASKA
I. INTRODUCTION
A. REASONS FOR AN OFFER OF PROOF
An attorney questions a witness on direct examination.1 An
objection to the question is sustained by the trial court.2 At this
point, the proponent of the witness must elucidate the testimony
that was expected to be given in response to the question.3 This
offer of proof must be made for three basic reasons. First, the trial
court should be shown that the testimony would be admissible and
proper.4 Second, the offer of proof is necessary in order that preju-
'The considerable differences between the requirements of an offer of
proof on cross-examination, as opposed to direct examination, are dis-
cussed at IV (A) of text.
2 An objection made in the very broadest and vaguest terms (e.g., "in-
competent, irrelevant, and immaterial"), if sustained by the judge, will
place the burden of making an adequate offer of proof upon the pro-
ponent of the evidence. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 118-19, n.27-35 (1954).
sThe offer of proof will generally be discussed here in terms of an offer
after an objection to an oral question to a witness, since this is the
situation most commonly occurring, and the one most discussed by the
courts. This situation, however, is not comprehensive. An offer of
proof is also necessary where written evidence is to be introduced.
In re Estate of Woodward, 147 Neb. 270, 23 N.W.2d 75 (1946); Central
City Bank v. Rice, 44 Neb. 594, 63 N.W. 60 (1895). See also McCoRMICK,
EvIDENcE 112 (1954): "In the case of tangible things, such as writings,
depositions, photographs, bullets, articles of clothing or the like, the
counsel for the introducing party (after having produced witnesses
to identify or authenticate the writing or other object) submits it to
opposing counsel for inspection, and when this has been done, presents
it to the judge, with the statement, 'We offer this (document or object,
describing it) in evidence.' In a jury trial it is customary then in case
of a writing for counsel to read it to the jury." The rules regarding
offers of proof are generally applicable to criminal as well as to civil
trials. Parker v. State, 164 Neb. 614, 83 N.W.2d 347 (1957); Dean v.
State, 128 Neb. 466, 259 N.W. 175 (1935); Savary v. State, 62 Neb.
166, 87 N.W. 34 (1901). In the Savary case, the court said: "As no offer
was made as to what the witness would testify in answer to the ques-
tion, we are unable to say there was prejudicial error in the ruling
complained of. The rule is, and it is applicable alike to criminal and
civil trials, that when to a question in direct examination objection is
interposed by the adverse party and sustained, in order to present the
ruling to this court for review, there must be an offer of proof of the
facts sought to be put in evidence by the question to which the answer
was excluded." Id. at 168, 87 N.W. at 35.
4 Gormley v. Peoples Cab, Inc., 142 Neb. 346, 6 N.W.2d 78 (1942);
Mathews v. State, 19 Neb. 330, 27 N.W. 234 (1886).
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dice may be shown in the exclusion of the testimony,5 in line with
the general rule of law that no issue is appealable unless the ap-
pellant's case has been weakened by the exclusion below.6 Third,
the offer allows the opponent to learn the nature of the testimony
and to reconsider the objection. These purposes must be kept in
mind throughout this consideration of the merits and requirements
of the rules applicable to offers of proof.
The courts have generally made little analysis of the above
purposes of the offer of proof. Indeed, the rule itself is usually
stated with a cursory remark such as, "it has long been the rule in
this state that... .,7 with virtually no consideration as to why offers
of proof have long been held necessary, or whether the rule should
be strictly applied in the particular case. Perhaps for this reason,
the courts have said little that is of any practical value in assisting
the attorney to make an offer of proof which will be satisfactory to
serve the purposes of the rule.
B. STANDARDS FOR AN OFFER OF PROOF
Unquestionably, the trial court may not misconstrue an offer
of proof in such a way as to make it ineffective. In fact, the trial
court seems to have a duty to construe the offer in favor of the
proponent if it is "fairly susceptible of a construction rendering the
evidence proffered admissible .... "8
Granting this duty of the court to so construe an offer of proof,
it is still not certain just how clearly admissible the evidence must
be shown to be. It has been said that the offer or question "must
clearly indicate the materiality of the answers sought,"9 and that
"if proffered evidence is prima facie admissible, it is the duty of the
court to receive it; otherwise it should be rejected."'0 Other cases,
5 Barr v. City of Omaha, 42 Neb. 341, 60 N.W. 591 (1894).
6 See, e.g., Tongue v. Perrigo, 130 Neb. 564, 572, 265 N.W. 737, 741 (1936):
"Certain other exhibits were excluded from evidence. Some holiday
and other greeting cards, photographs and telegrams, which at most
could only be cumulative as showing the unusually friendly relation
between defendant and Elizabeth [the deceased girl with whom the
defendant was accused of having had intercourse]. Even if they were
admissible (we think they were not), it was error without prejudice,
because they do not tend to establish any fact, unless it was the friendly
relation mentioned above, which is abundantly established without
them."
7 Olmsted v. Noll, 82 Neb. 147, 150, 117 N.W. 102, 104 (1908).
8 Horbach v. Boyd, 64 Neb. 129, 131, 89 N.W. 644, 645 (1902).
9 Gormley v. Peoples Cab, Inc., 142 Neb. 346, 349, 6 N.W.2d 78, 80 (1942).
10Phenix Ins. Co. v. Holcombe, 57 Neb. 622, 631, 78 N.W. 300, 302 (1899).
COMMENTS
however, have held offers of proof invalid even though the purpose
of the questioning was "evident" to the upper court." Perhaps it
would be impossible to establish any clear standard for offers of
proof applicable to all cases. The lack of any definite standard
makes it incumbent upon the proponent to make his offer of proof
indisputably definite and clear.
The problems regarding the adequacy of an offer of proof may
truly be serious. The failure to make an adequate offer may defeat
the attempt to admit the evidence and prevent an appeal on the
issue of the exclusion of such evidence.
As in the case of other rules which may cause the exclusion
of valuable evidence, the requirement of an offer of proof is a
necessary, and generally proper, protection for the rights and
interests of the parties to the trial. The requirement is, however,
technical and severe in some cases. The application of the rule
should be considered, not merely as an infallible formula, but
as a useful tool to be used carefully in specific circumstances to
obtain the objectives of the rule. The analysis here, then, is made
with the intention of determining the method of making an offer
of proof and of considering the value of the rules governing the
making of such offers.
II. THE NATURE OF AN OFFER OF PROOF
A. RESPONSIVENESS TO THE QUESTION
The first requirement in the making of an effective offer of
proof is that it be in response to the court's rejection of proffered
evidence.12 In other words, a statement by the proponent as to his
purposes in calling a witness, made before any question has been
asked of the witness, is not itself an adequate offer of proof. 3 The
reason for the requirement of a specific question preceding the
" Brennan-Love Co. v. McIntosh, 62 Neb. 522, 87 N.W. 327 (1901).
12 Farmers & Merchants Ins. Co. v. Dobney, 62 Neb. 213, 86 N.W. 1070
(1901).
1'Pike v. Hauptman, 83 Neb. 172, 174, 119 N.W. 231, 232, (1909): "The
rule appears to be that, unless there is pending a question to which the
offer made is responsive, and objection to the question has been sustained
by the court, that an offer of proof should not be entertained by the
court, and that sustaining an objection to such offer is not prejudicial
error. In other words, an offer to prove facts wholly disconnected
with any matter concerning which the witness has been questioned
is not proper, and presents no question for review by the district court."
(Citations omitted.)
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offer is apparently to allow the trial court a better opportunity to
weigh the evidence in relation to the question. It is doubtful,
however, that an offer to prove made before, rather than after, the
question, really serves the purposes of the offer of proof any less
effectively.14
B. ESTABLISHMENT OF ADMISSIBILITY
The basic purpose of requiring an offer of proof is to show
the admissibility of the testimony. With this purpose in mind,
it is almost unnecessary to say that an offer of proof, considered
with evidence already given or offered in the case, must show all
the facts which are requisite to the materiality and competency
of the testimony. 5 In Howerter v. Olson,16 a suit involving an
automobile accident in Wyoming, it was held not to be error to
exclude evidence of a Wyoming statute establishing brake standards,
where there was no offer to prove that the defendant had violated
the statute. Here, it cannot be said with any reasonableness that
the nature of the evidence was itself uncertain. Only the relevance
of the evidence was not disclosed. 7 The judge must be shown the
relation of the proffered question to the rest of the evidence at the
trial, and the burden is upon the proponent to show the materiality
and relevancy of the question.
Olmsted v. Noll" involved a suit by a wife against two liquor
companies on grounds that because they sold liquor to her husband
(an alcoholic), he could not provide support for her and the chil-
dren. On redirect examination, the defendant's witness, a baker,
was questioned: "Q. And he would buy goods of you, would he,
necessaries for the family? A. Yes, sir. Q. And pay for them?
A. Yes sir .... Q. Could you tell us for what amount he would
pay to you for necessaries?"' 9 An objection to the question was
sustained, and the appeal was denied on the issue of the sustained
objection because there was no offer of proof of the proffered
U Such an offer might help to make the record and question together
show the admissibility of the testimony for purposes of excusing the
absence of an offer of proof. See generally, part IV of text.
15 Blondel v. Bolander, 80 Neb. 531, 114 N.W. 574 (1908).
16145 Neb. 507, 17 N.W.2d 483 (1945).
17 "As we view this record, the condition of the brakes on plaintiff's unit
not being a proximate cause of, nor contributing to the cause of, the
accident, error, if any, in the ruling was not prejudicial." Id. at 516,
17 N.W.2d at 488.
18 82 Neb. 147, 117 N.W. 102 (1908).
19 Id. at 150, 117 N.W. at 103.
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evidence. The objection seems to have been that there was no
showing that the baker knew that the goods bought by the husband
were to be used by the husband for family purposes. In other
words, there was no indication that the witness was competent to
testify that the husband was providing food for his family. The
evidence must not only be material and relevant, but the witness
must be competent to answer the question.20 Further, there was no
showing as to the amount of goods purchased by the husband. If
the goods purchased were negligible in quantity, exclusion of the
evidence could hardly be injurious to the defendant-profferor. Thus,
the offer should state that the witness will show that the evidence
could not be excluded without prejudice. It may, in certain cases,
even be advisable to give the exact answer expected from the
witness.2'
Masters v. Marsh22 points out the reasons for an offer of proof,
and illustrates the type of facts which must be included in such
offer. In Marsh, the defendant in a bastardy action was attempting
to show the possible paternity of one other than the defendant, and
to attack the plaintiff's chastity. Defendant's counsel asked a
witness on direct examination if he had seen a young man other
than the defendant go into an unoccupied house at night with the
plaintiff. An objection to the question was sustained, but no offer
of proof was made. The court said that the sustaining of the objec-
tion could not be questioned on appeal since the defendant had not
offered to prove that the events happened at a time consistent with
the period of gestation, or that the parties were alone in the house
for any considerable period of time.
Masters v. Marsh23 is the type of case which makes an offer of
proof a necessary legal device. It is extremely important that the
testimony not reach the jury unless it is admissible. The testimony
is of such an inflammatory nature that it might well arouse the
jury against the plaintiff if improperly admitted. Still, the de-
20See also Mordhorst v. Nebraska Tel. Co., 28 Neb. 610, 44 N.W. 469 (1890).
21 Olmsted v. Noll, 82 Neb. 147, 117 N.W. 102 (1908). See also Mathews v.
State, 19 Neb. 330, 338, 27 N.W. 234, 237 (1886): "IT]he evidence which
the party proposes to offer must be presented to the court, as well as
the questions to which objection is made; the court will then be able
to determine whether or not the evidence is pertinent."
2219 Neb. 458, 27 N.W. 438 (1886).
23 Ibid.
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fendant should be given every opportunity to show that the evi-
dence should be admitted. Thus, an offer of proof is required.
24
C. RESPONSIVENESS TO THE PLEADINGS
A further requirement of a valid offer of proof is that it must
assert that the proffered testimony will tend to establish facts or a
theory of the case which has been well pleaded. Todd v. City of
Crete25 involved a railroad brakeman who was injured by the de-
fendant's negligently strung electric wires. The defendant asked a
witness on direct examination whether the plaintiff had contributed
to a relief fund from which he had been paid for his injuries upon
releasing the railroad from liability. The court upheld an objection
to the question. It went on to say that the defendant apparently
wanted to prove that his employer was a joint tort-feasor. This
defense, however, is affirmative and must be pleaded. Therefore,
even if there had been an offer of proof, it would have been in-
effective because of not being within the pleadings. 26 The initiation
of a proper offer of proof arises from the first pleadings.
Thus, the following requirements seem necessary in the making
of an offer of proof:
1. The offer must be made in response to the court's sustaining
of an objection to a specific attempt to introduce evidence, by a
question to a present witness, or by available documents or other
tangible evidence.
2. It must allege facts necessary to show that the proposed testi-
mony will materially relate to the questions in issue.
3. The offer must show that the evidence would be competent
24See Mathews v. State, 19 Neb. 330, 27 N.W. 234 (1886), where the de-
fendant in a rape case attempted, on cross-examination of the prosecu-
trix, to ask her questions challenging her chastity. It was held that
there was no error in the exclusion of the answers since there was no
offer to prove the facts solicited. Where the facts are of a highly sensi-
tive nature, the need for a showing of relevancy seems to be especially
high.
2579 Neb. 671, 113 N.W. 172 (1907).
26 See also Hamilton v. Ross, 23 Neb. 630, 37 N.W. 467 (1888). This was
an action for conversion brought by a wife who claimed the defendant
sheriff had converted her property under an execution of a judgment
against her husband. Defendant asked the husband various questions,
apparently to show fraud between the husband and the wife. Objec-
tions to the questions were sustained. No offers of proof were made.
Even had offers been made, there would have been no appeal from the
exclusion of the evidence because the defendant had not pleaded fraud.
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and that the witness would be competent and have the knowledge
to answer the question if permitted to do so.
4. The offer must assert that the answer, when given by the wit-
ness, would be such as to make its exclusion prejudicial. In some
cases, the proponent should specifically state the answer which
would be given by the witness.
5. The offer must not assert facts which go beyond the pleadings
of the case.
D. NoNPREJmIcIAL MAKING OF THE OFFER
Although no special form of making an offer of proof is re-
quired, the offer must be made in such a way that the proffered
evidence does not reach the jury. The purpose of the objection and
offer of proof is to prevent jury consideration of improper evidence.
Therefore, an offer improperly presenting objectionable evidence
may be grounds for reversal if prejudicial to the interests of the
opponent. This holds true even if the offer is made in good faith.27
E. RELEVANCE WHERE ONLY COMPETENCE IS CHALLENGED
The above discussion involved cases wherein the objection was
primarily to the materiality and relevancy of the question. The
discussion also applies, however, to situations where the objection
is principally to the competence of evidence to be admitted. In
Cook v. Ketchmark,28 a will case, the proponent attempted, on re-
buttal, to ask a question in regard to a conversation between the
deceased and the witness (who was the attorney of the deceased).
An objection was made on grounds that this was a privileged com-
munication. On appeal it was said that the conversation had not
involved a privileged communication because persons other than
the deceased and the witness had been present, but there was no
error in the exclusion of the testimony since the proponent had
made no offer to prove the evidence the attorney would have given.
27 Scripps v. Reilly, 38 Mich. 10, 16 (1878): '"Where the offer is likely
to be of such a character that it would have a tendency to prejudice or
influence the jury, the correct practice would be to present the article,
if in writing, to the court and counsel for examination, without stating
either the purport or substance of it.... That counsel acted in entire
good faith in offering these articles in the manner in which he did we
are willing to concede, but in the ardor of his zeal he went farther than
the law would protect him in doing." Of course, the trial court may,
in its discretion, require offers of evidence to be made out of the hearing
of the jury. Omaha Coal, Coke & Lime Co. v. Fay, 37 Neb. 68, 55 N.W.
211 (1893).
,28 174 Neb. 222, 117 N.W.2d 375 (1962).
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When the court rules that evidence will not be allowed because it
is incompetent, the attorney's job is not finished. It is still necessary
to offer to prove the evidence which would be given by the
witness. 29
III. THE EXTENT OF AN OFFER OF PROOF
A. THE DmEMMA
There would be little problem if the only instances which gave
rise to the necessity of an offer to prove were limited to isolated
questions needing merely a showing of materiality and competency.
Where an objection to only one question is at issue, it may be pos-
sible to restate the question, or the desired testimony might later
be elicited after a proper foundation has been laid. When a series
of questions is intended, however, and the judge's sustaining of
the opponent's objections indicates that that particular line of
questioning will not be allowed, the proponent is faced with a
serious dilemma. An extended series of questions, if rejected by
the court, is usually difficult to interject at a later point in the
examination. Omitting the testimony may critically injure the
proponent's case.
The proponent has three possible alternatives, each of which
may or may not be effective. He may ask his series of questions,
expecting objections to them to be sustained, and then make
individual offers of proof on the denial of each question. He may
make a narrative offer to prove a whole series of questions, the
offer being made either before any questions have been asked, or
after the first objection is sustained. Or he may decide to abandon
the line of questioning.
B. RESPONSIVENESS
It is sometimes said to be a general rule of evidence that an
answer should be responsive to the question.30 This rule is perhaps
29 See also Bland v. Fox, 172 Neb. 662, 111 N.W.2d 537 (1961), where
an expert witness' requested opinions on skid marks, discolorations
of the road, etc., were objected to on the grounds that he was not com-
petent to give such opinions. It was held that where there was no offer
to prove the facts expected in the testimony, there is no error in ex-
cluding the testimony. The case cites Parker v. State, 164 Neb. 614,
83 N.W.2d 347 (1957). But see Fries v. Goldsby, 163 Neb. 424, 80 N.W.2d
171 (1956).
30 Even this statement has been challenged as not being a true statement
of the law: 3 WIMORE, EVIDENCE § 785 at 160 (1940), quoting Under-
wood v. Cray, 94 Vt. 58, 60, 108 AtI. 513, 514 (1920): "It is not every ir-
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beneficial in expediting the process of the trial and in preventing
irrelevant or improper evidence from being admitted. The courts,
however, have grafted this rule onto the rule requiring the making
of an offer of proof.31 Thus, various cases have held defective any
offer of proof which offered facts beyond the limits of the ques-
tion.3 2 The reasonableness of this combination of rules is subject
to doubt.
Hans v. American Transfer Co. 33 involved an action for neg-
ligence against the plaintiff's employer for injuries incurred when
responsive answer given by a party that will support an exception. Not
only must such an answer be improper in substance, but it must be
apparent that the party intends to go beyond the question and to gain
an advantage." (Emphasis added by Prof. Wigmore.)
31Dunphy v. Bartenbach, 40 Neb. 143, 149, 58 N.W. 856, 858, (1894):
"While an offer to prove is necessary to illustrate the purpose for which
the question has been asked, we do not understand that by a mere offer
to prove certain facts the materiality, relevancy, or competency of
testimony, which by no possible means could be responsive to the ques-
tion propounded, is presented for determination. The objection sustained
in each instance under consideration was to an offer to prove made by
the attorney, not upon objection to a question in response to which no
answer had yet been given. After the question had been answered in
each case without objection, it was of doubtful propriety to object to
the answer; still more was that propriety strained by subsequently of-
fering to prove certain facts entirely foreign to the scope of the ques-
tion which had last been asked and answered. We are of the opinion
that the objections made and sustained cannot now be reviewed on
account of the facts to which attention has just been directed."
32 State v. Eggers, 175 Neb. 79, 120 N.W.2d 541 (1963); Webber v. City of
Scottsbluff, 150 Neb. 446, 35 N.W.2d 110 (1948); Exchange Elevator Co.
v. Marshall, 147 Neb. 48, 22 N.W.2d 403 (1946); Barr v. Post, 56 Neb.
698, 77 N.W. 123 (1898); Davis v. Getchell, 32 Neb. 792, 49 N.W. 776
(1891). In Barr v. Post, supra, which was an action for damages re-
sulting from the defendant's alleged assault and battery, defendant's
counsel asked medical witnesses: "I will ask you to state what con-
clusion was reached by the physicians there as to the nature of the
ailment of the difficulty that necessitated that operation [on the plain-
tiff]." Id. at 704, 77 N.W. at 125. The offer to prove for this question
asserted that the witness's testimony would show that the ailment
necessitating the operation could not have been caused by the de-
fendant's battery. The court held that "this offer was not within the
limits of the question which the court refused to permit the witness
to answer. If counsel desired to have his witness testify that the con-
dition of [the plaintiff] could not have been the result of an assault and
battery upon her, he should have asked the witness that question,
and then, had the court refused to permit it to be answered, made his
offer of proof." Id. at 705, 77 N.W. at 125-26.
33 90 Neb. 834, 134 N.W. 943 (1912).
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plaintiff fell off the defendant's manure wagon. In attempting to
prove damages, plaintiff claimed that he had previously earned
over 100 dollars per month while working for the Union Pacific Rail-
way. Defendant called the assistant pay clerk of Union Pacific and
asked him, "Do you know the reason why Hans left the services of
the Union Pacific?3 4 The offer of proof was that the witness knew
that Hans' habits were those of intoxication, so that he was
unable to perform his duties. The court held that "error cannot
be predicated on a rejected offer of proof not within the limits of
the question asked. '3 5 Thus, when defendant's counsel later de-
clared, "You may state why Hans was let out of the services of the
Union Pacific," 36 the court held that the question was inadmissible
because it assumed that Hans had been discharged by the Union
Pacific, a fact not proved. "Questions propounded to a witness
must not assume the existence of a fact not proven in the cause. '37
The double actions of the rules involved prevented the admission
of potentially admissible testimony. Apparently, the proponent
should have, in support of the first question, offered to prove that
the witness would have answered, "Yes," then asked "What was
the reason for Hans' leaving the services of the Union Pacific?"
The offer to prove then would have been that the witness would
answer that Hans was dismissed from the Union Pacific. The
third question, as to the reason for Hans' dismissal, would then
have had proper foundation. In the light of the avowed purposes
behind the requirements of offers of proof, the result reached by
the court in this case seems severe. There is no real uncertainty
in the purpose of the questions or the nature of the expected testi-
mony. The court's requirement that the offer of proof not go beyond
the limits of the question does not really act to assure the introduc-
tion of only material and competent evidence in cases of this type.
After all, how far beyond a question, "Do you know the reason?"
is an offer that, in effect, says, "The reason was .... "?
C. FOUNDATIONAL QUESTIONS
The first problem with the rule that an offer of proof must
be responsive to, and within the limits of, the question, is that, as
in Hans v. American Transfer Co.,38 a defective offer of proof is
34 Id. at 836, 134 N.W. at 944.
35 Id. at 836-37, 134 N.W. at 944. (Citations omitted.)
36 Id. at 837, 134 N.W. at 944.
37 Id. at 837, 134 N.W. at 944. (Citations omitted.)
3890 Neb. 834, 134 N.W. 943 (1912).
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not sufficient to support a later question. Further, in Brennan-
Love v. McIntosh,3 9 a defective offer of proof was held to be in-
sufficient to support a later question because the proponent failed
to obtain a ruling on the prior offer.
D. TIE NARRATIm OFFER OF PROOF
The second objection to the requirement that an offer be re-
sponsive is that the narrative offer of proof of a whole line of
questioning is placed in serious jeopardy.40 Assume a line of ques-
tioning requiring twenty questions. The opponent objects to the
first question, and the court sustains the objection in such manner
as to indicate that the whole series will be considered objectionable.
If the offer of proof is made in such a manner as to be, in effect,
an offer of the whole line of questioning, the offer may be too
'broad to be effective. The whole line of questioning is thus dif-
ficult to establish. The offer of proof for such a foundation ques-
tion, however, if limited to the question itself, may not be suf-
ficient to show prejudice in the exclusion of the evidence.41
An alternative method of making the offer of proof is to go
through the whole series of twenty questions, receive objections,
and make an offer of proof for each question separately. This
method would apparently insure the validity of the offer of proof,
but it has various practical objections. The first difficulty is that,
as in Hans, the proponent may easily confuse the questions and
previous offers of proof, so that he bases a later question upon a
previously invalid offer of proof. Secondly, the question-and-
answer method of offering proof often forces the proponent into
a position whereby he appears to the judge and jury to be asking
unnecessary, ineffectual questions which everyone knows will
never be answered. Rather than to risk irritating the judge and
39 62 Neb. 522, 87 N.W.2d 327 (1901).
40 State v. Eggers, 175 Neb. 79, 120 N.W.2d 541 (1963).
41 It should be interjected, however, that a foundation question carries a
lesser burden of proof than does a major question. Johnson v. Winston,
68 Neb. 425, 428, 94 N.W.2d 607, 608 (1903): "The inquiry . ..was
merely preliminary, intended to show the knowledge of the witness,
and to afford a basis, as the offer subsequently disclosed, for a ques-
tion as to the proper remedy. Where the question is one of this charac-
ter, more latitude should be allowed in its form. An attorney may
not always know exactly what his witness will testify to, and where
he is merely laying the foundation leading up to other evidence, it
would often result in great injustice to confine the question to the same
limits as if the examination had proceeded well into the subject." Com-
pare State v. Eggers, 175 Neb. 79, 120 N.W.2d 541 (1963).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW VOL. 43, NO. 1
jury, the proponent might well be forced to abandon the line of
questioning.
It would seem that the narrative method of making an offer
of proof for a series of questions would have the double advantage
of showing the purpose and admissibility of a series of questions,
and of making the process of the trial faster and more efficient.
To place the problem of offering proof in its proper perspective,
it must be realized that the series of questions which the proponent
is offering to prove may well be the whole of the evidence upon a
particular theory of the case as found in the pleadings. If the
facts that might be alleged in the offer of proof have already been
properly pleaded, should not such allegations in the pleadings be
considered with the offer of proof to show the admissibility of the
evidence? Certainly the converse is true. If an offer of proof
asserts facts which were not within the pleadings, then the offer
of proof is necessarily ineffective. 42 Where the offer is made to
prove a series of questions that in effect will establish a theory
of the case well-pleaded, requirement of a full question-and-answer
type of offer of proof is extreme. Although the pleadings alone
would not necessarily constitute an offer of proof in themselves,
they should act, with the rest of the record, to excuse the absence
of an offer of proof of the question-and-answer type.
IV. SITUATIONS EXCUSING AN OFFER OF PROOF
It must be clearly understood that an offer of proof should
always be made where feasible. Failure to make an offer carries
with it the strong possibility that appeal from the exclusion of
the testimony will be barred by the absence of any offer of proof.
There are, however, a few cases which have tended to mitigate the
rules requiring an offer of proof. Perhaps there would be more
such cases but for the essential nature of the offer of proof. The
proponent often ignores the necessity for an offer of proof, either
deeming it undesirable or neglecting to make one. He, therefore,
on appeal, argues the issues of the exclusion of the evidence, again
failing to argue that an offer of proof was unnecessary below. The
opponent-appellee, then, argues that the issues regarding the ad-
missibility of evidence cannot be heard on appeal because of the
absence of any offer of proof. This one-sided argument on the issues
of the offer of proof undoubtedly contributes to the harshness of
the rules requiring such offers to be made.
42 See note 28 supra.
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A. CROSS-EXAMiNATION
The principal instance in which an offer of proof is excused is
that of the question asked on cross-examination. In Rice v. Ameri-
can Protective Health & Accident Co.,43 an action for recovery on
a health and accident insurance policy, defendant's counsel asked
the plaintiff how many days he had been confined to his home. An
objection was sustained on grounds that the question was im-
material and not proper cross-examination, and no offer of proof
was made. On appeal, the court held that the question was material
and found proper cross-examination, saying: 44
[The rule requiring offers of proof] is a valid one as applied to
the proponent of a witness but it has no application where the
question is on cross-examination and comes within the purview
of the material subjects inquired into on direct examination.
Unquestionably the cross-examining counsel is in a different
position from the counsel on direct examination. Although he may
expect to gain valuable and admissible evidence, he is in no posi-
tion to be sure as to the answers that will be given by the op-
ponent's witness. Cross-examination questions might well provide
no testimony favorable to the proponent of the questions. Thus,
the cross-examiner often could not show prejudice in the exclusion
of the testimony. Some cases have applied the direct examination
rules to the cross-examination situation without recognizing that
there is a very fundamental difference between the two.4 5
In Re Estate of Johnson,46 the court stated:
This rule [requiring the making of offers of proof] is sometimes,
though rarely, enforced in cross-examination. When the con-
dition of the record and the form of the question itself shows that
it is relevant and competent, no offer of proof is necessary. The
many decisions of this court in regard to requiring an offer of
proof should be so understood.
In Re Estate of Johnson, the court dealt with the problem of the
necessity of an offer of proof on cross-examination. The case has
since been cited, however, in cases applying the rules and standards
in Johnson to excuse the absence of an offer to prove a question on
direct examination.4V
43 157 Neb. 256, 59 N.W.2d 378 (1953).
44 Id. at 274-75, 59 N.W.2d at 383.
45 Webber v. City of Scottsbluff, 150 Neb. 446, 35 N.W.2d 110 (1948); Cox
v. Kee, 107 Neb. 587, 186 N.W. 974 (1922); Gillam v. Mann, 85 Neb. 765,
124 N.W. 143 (1910).
46 100 Neb. 791, 797-98, 161 N.W. 429, 431 (1903).
47 Johnson v. Griepenstroh, 150 Neb. 126, 135-36, 33 N.W.2d 549, 555 (1948).
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B. DIRECT EXAMINATION
In some cases, an offer to prove a direct examination question
has been excused, quite independently of any reliance on the cross-
examination rules. In Williams v. Fuller,48 an action for libel, cer-
tain evidence was excluded which would have tended to establish
the truth, good motives, and justifiable ends of the allegedly libelous
newspaper article. Thoroughly criticizing the rule requiring the
making of an offer of proof,49 the court allowed the appeal from the
exclusion of the evidence, since the record and the question itself
indicated the nature of the evidence to be introduced. Considering
the purposes of the offer of proof, the court suggests that the rule
requiring an offer be limited to those situations wherein the rule
truly has merit. A trial is merely a means to an end-the discovery
of truth in order to dispense justice in the light of the truth-not
a mere game of wits between counsel.
It is incumbent upon the counsel to prepare the record for evi-
dence to be admitted, especially where crucial objections are ex-
pected to be received to a major part of the case. Then, if objection
is made and it is not feasible to make an offer of proof, there will
be a possibility of having the offer held unnecessary. The Supreme
Court of Nebraska has not stated exactly what the record must
show for the absence of an offer to be excused. Apparently, it
48 68 Neb. 354, 94 N.W. 118 (1903).
49 The court said, Id. at 361, 94 N.W. at 120: "But it is urged by the plain-
tiff that the record shows no offer to prove such facts [which would
have established the truth, good motives, and justifiable ends of certain
allegedly libelous newspaper statements]. The rule requiring a formal
offer to prove, in order to obtain a review in the appellate court of a
ruling by which evidence is excluded, is of doubtful value at best; it is
a matter of grave doubt whether its application does not more fre-
quently defeat than promote justice, and retard, rather than expedite,
its administration. The reason generally assigned for it is that such
offer challenges the attention of the trial court to the nature and
character of the evidence sought to be introduced, and enables it to
rule on the objection interposed advisedly. We are not disposed to
extend the rule beyond the reason underlying it. In this case, the
questions propounded clearly indicate what the defendants expected to
establish by the answers thereto. Under such circumstances, it would
have savored of an insult to the intelligence of the court to make an
offer showing what the defendants expected to prove by the witnesses.
To enforce the rule, under such circumstances, would be absurd. We
think the evidence was improperly excluded, and that the defendants
were thereby deprived of a constitutional and statutory right. Con-
stitution, art. 1, sec. 5.... ." (Other citations omitted.) See also Thamann
v. Merritt, 111 Neb. 639, 197 N.W. 413 (1924). Id. at 361, 94 N.W. at 120.
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would not be necessary that the record and question show exactly
the evidence intended, since this would, in effect, make the evidence
merely cumulative. If it were merely cumulative, its exclusion
would not be error, even if otherwise admissible.0 It is necessary
only that the record suggest the testimony to be received in re-
sponse to the question, and show the facts necessary to make such
suggested evidence relevant and competent. Thus, the courts have
shown at least a tendency to infer admissibility and prejudice when
circumstances warrant.
CONCLUSION
The offer of proof requirement is, at best, a stop-gap pro-
cedure. It serves the purpose of showing the opposing counsel, the
trial court, and the appellate court, that proffered testimony, ex-
cluded by the trial court, is indeed admissible, and that the ex-
clusion of it is error. The guiding consideration should always be
that of making clear exactly what evidence should be admitted.
Though this may seem superficially easy, it must be recognized
that the vantage point of the proponent is more favorable to under-
standing the proposed testimony than that of the other persons.
This difference in vantage points may tend to cause the proponent
to underestimate the proof necessary to make the evidence ad-
missible. Thus, the proponent should always attempt to see the
offer of proof in the light of the record and the question, as others
will see the offer.
Although somewhat greater flexibility in the rules regarding
the making of offers of proof might be desired, the requirements
are probably not too restrictive. In certain cases, it would be de-
sirable to allow narrative offers of proof and other offers beyond
the propounded question, rather than force upon the proponent the
burdensome task of making an extended question-and-answer type
of offer. Similarly, greater recognition should be given to the prop-
osition that in many cases an offer of proof is a needless and time-
consuming procedure. Considering the necessity of preventing the
admission of incompetent and irrelevant evidence, however, the
burden of challenging or establishing the competence or relevance
of the evidence must be placed upon one of the parties at the trial.
This burden is rationally placed upon the proponent, since he is in
greater command of the facts regarding the admissibility of the
evidence.
Calvin E. Robinson '64
50 Klinginsmith v. Allen, 155 Neb. 674, 53 N.W.2d 77 (1952).
